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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Does foreign aid help economic development?  Although the empirical 
economics literature on aid effectiveness, which investigates the 
macroeconomic impact of foreign aid on the economic development of 
poor countries, has grown briskly—both  in volume and in econometric 
sophistication--it has shed surprisingly little light on this question.  
Aid has in many instances been   accompanied by rapid economic growth 
and brisk poverty reduction; but in others, it has been accompanied by 
deteriorating economic outcomes. Given the vast diversity of empirical 
economic outcomes across countries, summarizing this experience in the 
form of a robust statistical relationship has proved extremely difficult and 
contentious. While some authors have concluded that foreign aid is 
effective, others have reached the diametrically opposite conclusion. Yet 
still others have gone on to find a common ground between the two 
conclusions: even if aid is usually ineffective, it can be effective under 
some special circumstances.  
In view of the different readings of the evidence, the economics 
profession has become sharply divided between those who are optimistic 
about the impact of foreign aid and those who are pessimistic. The body 
of research on aid effectiveness, which was built around the cross-
2 | P a g e  
 
country regression framework, has been highly aggregative and narrowly 
focused. The state of the current literature was succinctly summarized by 
Rajan and Subramanian (2011), two leading contributors to the subject: 
“This literature does not provide robust evidence of either a positive or 
negative correlation between foreign aid inflows and the economic 
growth of poor countries.”  
The present paper argues that the empirical research on aid effectiveness 
has few coherent and robust findings either to inform or to guide policy, 
and that aid policies and practices have often been influenced by defunct 
research that has proven conclusively wrong. To establish this argument, 
this paper first provides a brief critical review of the state of the empirical 
research that has underpinned much of the present day foreign-
assistance policies of donor agencies, and then discusses the policy issues 
that have featured in current aid-effectiveness deliberations. This 
juxtaposition makes it clear that there is a big disjunction between the 
empirical economic research and the policies and practices of aid.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the background to 
the current debate on aid effectiveness and places the ongoing analytical 
and policy issues into perspective; Section III provides a synoptic review 
of the current research on aid effectiveness and highlights both the 
current debates and the disparate and conflicting findings; Section IV 
reviews some of the salient policy issues associated with the current aid 
policies and practices in light of the research on aid effectiveness; and 
finally, based on our preceding discussions, Section V offers some 
concluding observations on the state of foreign aid empirics and policies.  
II.  THE  CONTEXT 
 
Research on foreign aid has always been marked by heated 
controversies. In the early days of foreign aid, research focused on the 
impact of aid on domestic saving, which then was considered the most 
critical determinant of economic development. While optimists held that 
foreign aid would lead to a dollar-for-dollar increase in savings, pessimists 
argued that foreign aid would lead to unproductive government 
expenditure, corruption, and the crowding out of private savings.  
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Experiences varied across countries. However, the “average” results from 
the regression   literature indicate that the truth lies in between these 
two extremes:  while aid does increase savings, it does not increase 
savings dollar-by-dollar by the amount of aid.  This literature, which is 
considered crude by today’s technical standard, focused on savings and 
investment as a measure of aid effectiveness; this reflected a narrow 
perspective, because savings-investments are a means, not the end, of 
economic development.  
The next round of research focused on the relationship between aid and 
economic growth. An important earlier contributor was Boone (1996), 
who was applauded for his technical econometric innovation –being the 
first to introduce the so-called instrumental variable method to this 
analysis—as well as for his forceful argument. He attributed to political-
economic reasons the ineffectiveness of aid to raise growth. Boone 
reasoned that in a society where the political elite dominate the masses, 
aid is no more than an income transfer to the elite group.  That transfer 
only increases the consumption of the rich to the exclusion of the poor, 
as the latter has no effective representation in the polity. Boone’s 
conclusions apparently flounder in the face of evidence to the contrary:   
many aid-recipient countries have made significant strides in poverty 
reduction in the last thirty or so years. His conclusions, which were a 
broad-brush generalization of the conditions in developing countries, 
nevertheless, resonated with many economists as well as policymakers in 
developed countries who were skeptical about the impact of aid. 
Although by the mid-nineties there was a considerable volume of 
empirical work on the macroeconomic impact of aid (for a review, see 
Hansen and Tarp 2000), it received little attention outside the academic 
community. The intellectual isolation of this period was broken by two 
papers (the second being the published version of the first) by Burnside 
and Dollar (BD) (1997, 2001)1 that suggested that (i) aid is generally 
ineffective in promoting growth, and (ii) the impact of aid on growth is 
                                                     
1 This empirical research,  which utilized a dataset that covered 56 
countries over the period 1970-1993, was  based on a set of regression 
equations that took the general form: GDP growth (per capita) = other 
terms + b. aid + c. (aid*policy) + d. aid2 + error.   
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positive in countries with a good policy environment. This conditional 
effectiveness is indicated by the significant and positive coefficient on the 
“aid*policy” interaction in the growth regression.2 
The term “good policy” has been used by BD to indicate macroeconomic 
soundness. It is an index of fiscal, monetary, and trade policy indicators—
more precisely, it is a linear combination of the budget surplus, inflation, 
and trade openness. The appeal of the BD proposition of conditional aid 
effectiveness is its reductive simplicity; it encapsulates the issue of aid 
effectiveness into a simple success criterion: an index of sound 
macroeconomic policies that is easily monitored and fully consistent with 
the prevailing orthodoxy of the “Washington consensus.”   
The principal policy conclusion that has been widely drawn by the 
international donor community from the BD work is selectivity: aid should 
be allocated only to countries with good policies. The principle of 
selectivity has gradually emerged as the conventional wisdom and the 
operating framework for aid allocation by international development 
agencies. 
The message of selectivity was further reinforced in the high-profile 
World Bank (1998) report Assessing Aid, which went beyond the 
quantitative results: it added further “evidence” from the World Bank’s 
extensive evaluation studies. This emphasis on selectivity is, however, 
neither new nor novel. Almost four decades ago, Bauer, a fervid critic of 
foreign aid, suggested that aid be allocated “more selectively both 
politically and geographically” (1966, p. 32). Bauer (1984, pp. 60-61) 
exhorted donors to be “deliberately discriminating” and recommended 
that aid be given only to those governments that “promote the welfare of 
                                                     
2 Burnside and Dollar find that none of the regression coefficients are 
significant in their full sample. However, when they exclude some 
“outlier” observations, the aid-squared term becomes insignificant. Next 
they drop the aid-squared term and experiment with a modified 
regression equation: GDP growth (per capita) = other terms + b. aid + c. 
(aid* policy) + error; this exercise renders the coefficient of aid 
insignificant but makes the coefficient of aid-policy interaction term 
highly significant.  
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the people” by “effective administration, the performance of the 
essential tasks of government and the pursuit of liberal economic 
policies.” However, what gave the argument of BD its added cogency was 
its apparent rigorous empirical grounding.  
Since its publication, the BD analysis came under intense scrutiny, which 
slowly chipped away at the conclusions of these researchers. However, 
even if their evidence is taken at face value, it is not clear what conclusion 
one can reasonably infer from it. If aid has been more effective in some 
countries, does that imply that replicating the same conditions elsewhere 
will bring forth first-order improvements in aid efficiency? However, many 
of these conditions are not simply replicable. Some political and legal 
institutions in poor countries are historically rooted and shaped by 
political, historical and social constraints peculiar to the individual country; 
consequently, change can only be gradual or it could require substantial 
investments of human, physical and financial resources that are beyond 
the immediate fiscal capacity of the country (Quibria, 2013).  
III.  THE  RESEARCH  CONTROVERSIES 
  
BD research on aid effectiveness has stimulated a sizeable growth in the 
empirical literature on aid effectiveness. This literature has both 
examined the robustness of the BD empirical findings and advanced a 
number of alternative hypotheses on aid effectiveness.  
A.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
The inquiry into whether the BD conditional effectiveness proposition is 
robust has proceeded at three different levels. First, a number of 
authorsfor example, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp 
(2001), Hudson and Mosley (2001), and Lensink and White (2001)—have 
undertaken similar empirical investigations by relying on the growth-
regression framework. Their inquiries, however, have differed in terms of 
regression models, data sets, and the use of estimators; and none of 
these models have yielded a significant interaction effect between the BD 
policy index and aid. Second, Easterly, Levin, and Roodman (2004)—who 
re-estimated the BD model with an updated and extended dataset (a 
longer timeframe and greater country coverage)--could not also find any 
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statistically significant aid-policy interaction term. Finally, Roodman 
(2007), who has conducted a further set of robustness tests, noted that 
the BD (2000) result is not robust with alternative plausible definitions of 
aid, policies, and growth. Although the BD analysis has been largely 
debunked by economists, it continues to wield considerable influence on 
aid donors. 
Recent years have seen the development of a set of alternative 
hypotheses on aid effectiveness. First, the empirical works by such 
authors as Hadjimichael et al. (1995), Durbarry et al. (1998), and Lensink 
and White (1999) showed that aid contributes positively to growth but its 
marginal contribution is subject to diminishing returns.3 This result was 
further confirmed by Hansen and Tarp (2001). They formulated a unified 
empirical framework that allows for various types of nonlinearities in the 
aid-growth relationship, such as quadratic aid and policy along with aid-
policy interaction. They found  that when the empirical relationship 
introduces nonlinearity in the impact of aid, it drives out the significance 
of the aid*policy interaction effect. This implies that aid has a positive 
effect on growth, although the effect seems to taper off as the volume of 
aid increases. This result is not conditional on the existence of “good 
policy.” Rodman (2007), who carried out an extensive set of robustness 
tests on the cross-country aid-growth relationships, found this result to 
be robust on a number of counts. 
                                                     
3 This diminishing return--which arises from bottlenecks in the physical 
and human capital infrastructure--possibly reflects the absorptive 
capacity constraint, an idea that dates back to Millikan and Rostow 
(1957), Rosenstein-Rodan (1961), and Chenery and Strout (1966). The 
telltale signs of the absorptive capacity constraints are often manifest in 
the annual portfolio performance reviews (which identify various 
implementation issues) of the donor agencies. However, one needs to be 
careful not to attribute all implementation delays to absorptive capacity 
constraints. Some of these implementation problems may also stem from 
the cumbersome policies, procedures, and practices across donor 
agencies that put an enormous demand on the scarce administrative 
resources of the poor countries.  Easterly (2002) provided an interesting 
account of the heavy transaction costs of foreign aid on recipient 
countries. 
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Second, the above hypothesis of unconditional aid effectiveness was 
further confirmed by Clemens et al. (2012), who found that on average 
aid has been effective –with a modest and positive effect on growth and 
investment--when aid is economic. Clemens et al. divided foreign 
assistance into three categories: (i) emergency and humanitarian aid, 
which is likely to be negatively correlated with growth; (ii) aid that 
impacts growth only in the long run, such as aid to support democracy, 
the environment, health, and education; and (iii) aid that could stimulate 
growth within four years, such as various types of policy-based lending, 
investments in infrastructure, and aid for productive sectors such as 
industry and agriculture. Clemens et al.’s analysis focused on the last 
type, which accounts for almost half of all foreign assistance. They found 
that there is a positive causal relation between this type of aid and 
economic growth, albeit one that is subject to diminishing returns. This 
finding is not conditional on the recipient’s quality of institutions or 
policies. The paper reported that the statistical results are robust and 
relatively free from the econometric estimation problems typical of 
growth regressions.  
Third, Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) argued that a country’s structural 
vulnerability (to external shocks) has a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of aid. Adding a “vulnerability” variable4 to the BD 
formulation, they found  that policy, aid, and vulnerability all have a 
significant impact on growth. They found  that the aid-policy interaction 
term is no longer significant but that aid is more effective when structural 
vulnerability is high. Aid flows help to promote growthor to contain 
negative growthin countries that are structurally vulnerable to external 
shocks. The Guillaumont and Chauvet ( 2001)  hypothesis  regarding the 
role of structural vulnerability to external shock on aid effectiveness was 
further confirmed by Collier and Dehn (2001), who found that the 
                                                     
4 Guillaumont and Chauvet included four components in their 
vulnerability index : instability of agricultural income (a proxy for natural 
disasters), volatility of export earnings, the long-term trend in the terms 
of trade, and the initial population. Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004) have 
subsequently argued that as political instability is widespread in the 
developing world, the discussion of aid effectiveness should explicitly 
consider political instability.  
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interaction term involving the change in aid and the change in export 
prices is significant.  
Fourth,  Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) highlighted the role of non-
economic structural factors on aid effectiveness. In particular, they found 
that geographical and climate-related factors had a significant impact on 
growth (both directly and through the aid*tropics interaction effect). In 
general, they maintained that geographically challenged countries display 
a lower level of effectiveness, a fact that should be factored into the aid-
allocation calculus. 
Fifth, a set of recent studies by Rajan and Subramanian (2007, 2011) 
argued that aid is simply ineffective (the unconditional aid-
ineffectiveness hypothesis):  the first paper suggested   that foreign aid 
reduces the efficiency of manufacturing investment by adversely 
affecting governance and thereby limiting the growth of manufacturing 
exports that have been the traditional engines of growth; the second 
paper suggested  that the beneficial impact of aid can be significantly 
nullified by the inevitable erosion of competitiveness (of the tradable 
sectors) caused by  aid inflows.. They argued that this happens due to the 
real exchange rate overvaluation associated with any large windfall; i.e., 
the so-called Dutch disease.  
Though the empirical research of Rajan and Subramanian was careful and 
rigorous, they seemed to overstate the importance of the Dutch disease. 
Even if Rajan and Subramanian were correct in believing that aid can 
erode competitiveness in certain sectors, it is not clear why government 
cannot counter this adverse effect by appropriate fiscal and monetary 
policies. Furthermore, while developing countries typically produce far 
below capacity, the symptoms of the Dutch disease arise when countries 
produce close to their production possibilities’ frontiers. Moreover, if 
foreign assistance is directed toward improving the productive capacity 
of the economy (through investments in infrastructure, education, 
institutions, and health), this productivity increase could potentially 
offset the loss of competitiveness resulting from the Dutch disease 
(Adam and Bevan 2006).  A recent study by Fielding and Gibson (2012) on 
Sub-Saharan Africa found that the long-run impact   of foreign aid on the 
9 | P a g e  
 
real-exchange rate was far from uniform across countries —including 
some measure of real-exchange rate depreciation in some countries.   
Finally, in recent years, econometric works have included meta-
analyses—the regression of regression analyses— to synthesize the 
results from the existing body of empirical studies. These meta-analyses 
control for heterogeneity among studies. One putative advantage of a 
meta-analysis is that it can potentially overcome the subjectivity of the 
traditional literature surveys and provide a more systematic and 
objective quantitative assessment of the existing body of findings. 
Surprisingly, even these types of studies, which are supposed to provide 
more objective analyses, have contributed little to resolving the 
controversies. Consider, for instance, two such studies by  Doucouliagos 
and Paldman (2009) and Mekasha and Tarp (2011): while the former 
failed to find any significant impact of foreign aid on growth, the latter 
found an impact that is  both positive and statistically significant.  
B.  FINAL  OBSERVATIONS 
Recent years have seen a huge proliferation of econometric studies in all 
areas, including aid effectiveness--thanks to the easy availability of high-
powered microcomputers, sophisticated software, and new innovative 
econometric techniques. However, as the foregoing brief review of these 
studies of aid effectiveness suggests, this empirical literature has yielded 
few robust conclusions to inform practical policies.  
This literature, which is  based almost exclusively on growth regressions, 
has many shortcomings. First, much of the empirics are based on ad hoc 
specifications with little or no rigorous theoretical underpinnings. 
Second, while recent years have seen a progressive growth in 
econometric complexity, they have not yielded greater clarity in 
understanding. The mechanics of the process seems to have largely 
overtaken thinking and reflection. Third, despite improvements, growth 
regressions are still fraught with myriad of technical econometric issues 
such as parameter heterogeneity and endogenous regressors, 
measurement errors, influential observations, and error correlation: a 
host of issues that undermine reliability (Temple, 1999).  
As the macro aid-effectiveness literature has failed to make any 
meaningful contribution to the understanding of the intricacies of aid 
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effectiveness, it has led many to explore alternative, micro approaches. 
One such approach is the evaluation of aid projects, programs and 
policies through randomized control trials (RCTs). Under idealized 
conditions that seldom obtain, RCTs can overcome some of the 
methodological shortcomings of the macro aid effectiveness literature 
and provide impact evaluation of micro-level aid interventions. However, 
the RCT approach has its own limitations.  First and foremost, it cannot 
analyze the effect of an economy-wide policy change such as trade 
liberalization. Second, it is now well known that there is a “micro-macro” 
paradox, which suggests that the success at the project level does not 
ensure success at the macro level. Even if all the projects are  successful it 
does not mean that they will  ensure  success at the macroeconomic level 
of because of the so-called fungibility issue—i.e., aid money being used 
for purposes other than those earmarked.   Third, it provides information 
only about the average impact, not about when and how it works. In 
other words, RCTs provide little information about the underlying causal 
mechanisms. Finally, even with their considerable expense, RCTs provide 
at best local knowledge that may not apply to other contexts: there is no 
reason to suppose what works in one place will work elsewhere.  This 
issue has come to be known as the problem of external validity. All this 
has prompted the suggestion that the secret of aid effectiveness is more 
likely to be revealed by trial and errors than by randomized control trials 
(Deaton, 2013). 
In short, the existing “rigorous” empirical literature appears to have hit a 
wall : it offers little illumination beyond providing statistical codification 
of the obvious: foreign aid has been effective in some countries and 
ineffective in others. This begs the question whether   this line of analysis 
should be abandoned in favor of in-depth longitudinal studies of 
individual countries that can bring to the fore important country-specific 
historical, social, political and cultural factors, often glossed over by 
cross-country regression analysis. It can be argued that the salient issues 
of aid effectiveness for Nepal, for example, can only be gleaned through 
in-depth studies of Nepal-- and not by context-less generic regressions 
using data from a hundred-plus countries. To derive maximum benefits 
from such studies, they should be conducted within a common analytical 
framework and be informed by economic theory, history and solid 
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empirical evidence. However, as noted by Ranis (2006), such studies, 
which are few and far between, should be an integral part of the future 
research agenda on aid effectiveness.  
 
IV.  SOME  POLICY  ISSUES 
 
The following section highlights some policy issues that are associated 
with the design and delivery of foreign development assistance. This 
section examines the implications of recent research on policy issues and, 
in particular, how the design and delivery can be further informed and 
improved by  research.  
A.  GROWTH  VERSUS  POVERTY  REDUCTION 
Poverty reduction has been accepted as the overarching development 
objective of the international development community. This has been 
formalized in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),5 which were 
adopted by the United Nations at the Development Summit of the UN in 
2000. Despite the acceptance of poverty reduction as the overarching 
objective of international development assistance, the bulk of the current 
research does not reflect this concern: most research in this area is 
concerned with economic growth than poverty reduction.    
This neglect partly reflects a bias of the economics profession in favor of 
growth empirics and partly reflects the general perception that growth 
and poverty reduction are essentially coterminous. The latter is reflected 
                                                     
5 The MDG-concept of poverty is multi-dimensional: it is expressed in 
terms of a number of goals and indicators, which include eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger; achievement of universal primary 
education; promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women; 
reduction of child mortality; improvement of maternal health; combating 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; and ensuring environmental 
sustainability. While the goals represent laudable benchmarks to address 
global poverty, they have been arbitrarily set: it is not clear why all 
developing countries should follow an identical path to poverty reduction 
regardless of their considerable differences.  
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in such statements as “the aid bureaucracies [these days] define their 
final objective as “poverty reduction, [which is] today’s more politically 
correct name for ‘growth’” (Easterly 2003, p.34).  
However, the distinction between growth and poverty reduction is not a 
trivial one.  The examples of India and Bangladesh are instructive. As Sen 
(2011) argued, while Bangladesh has half the income of India in per 
capita terms, it outperforms India in almost all social and human 
development indicators. This disjunction between economic growth and 
human and social indicators suggests that it is important to focus directly 
on poverty and human development. While this shift in focus may 
dislodge some economists from their comfort zone, it will also render 
their work more relevant and realistic.  
There are, of course, exceptions. Some studies have focused on 
poverty—albeit in indirect and somewhat perfunctory ways. One such 
example is BD (1998), who by following    their earlier works on aid-policy 
interactions (BD 1997, 2000), run   a set of regressions that replace 
economic growth as the dependent variable with infant mortality as a 
proxy for poverty: a choice that is not clear, since other more obvious 
(income/consumption) measures of poverty are available. Not 
surprisingly, BD’s (1998) findings are completely analogous to their 
studies on the growth-effects of aid. Specifically, they find that aid 
reduces infant mortality, but only under good economic management.6 
Since BD do not conduct any sensitivity analysis, robustness issue 
remains: how would this relationship change if poverty is measured in 
different ways?  
A more interesting, though perhaps equally questionable, story emerges 
from the work of Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). They ask an apparently 
simple question: what is the “poverty-efficient” aid-allocation rule? That 
                                                     
6 The index of economic management used in this regression is given by: 
management = -1.8 + .65 x ICRGE + 5.4 x Fiscal - 1.4 x Inflation + 2.1 x 
Open, where ICRGE is a measure of institutional quality strength that 
includes property rights, absence of corruption, and quality of the 
bureaucracy; Open is the Sachs-Warner measure of trade openness; 
Inflation is the rate of increase of the price level; and Fiscal is the budget 
surplus relative to GDP. 
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is, how should we allocate aid to bring about a maximum reduction in 
global poverty? This set of papers has received less attention than some 
of the earlier research of BD (1997, 2000); however, they should not be 
viewed in isolation. In essence, they complement the earlier papers to 
complete their story about aid and development.  
According to Collier and Dollar, the impact of aid on poverty depends on 
two factors: (i) its impact on per-capita income growth, which is subject 
to diminishing returns; and (ii) the relationship between per-capita 
income growth and poverty reduction. The first can be derived from the 
BD aid-growth relationship, and the second by the growth elasticity of 
poverty.7 Here Collier and Dollar make a heroic and patently unrealistic 
assumption8 that the growth elasticity of poverty is two for all countries. 
The optimal allocation is obtained by equating the marginal productivity 
of aid in terms of poverty reduction across recipient countries. As the 
growth elasticity of poverty is uniform and constant across countries, this 
implies that the optimal allocation would be obtained when the marginal 
contribution of aid to economic growth is equal across countries. Their 
empirical results suggest that (i) the existing allocation of aid is grossly 
inefficient; and (ii) if aid allocation had followed the Collier-Dollar 
efficiency principle,9 the poverty reduction impact would double. 
                                                     
7 As  Srinivasan (2001) argues, the growth elasticity of poverty—which 
expresses a relationship between two endogenous variables of economic 
growth and poverty—is neither  a stable nor a “deep” parameter (in the 
sense of being related to technology and preferences, Lucas, 1976). As 
Lucas has argued, the use of such parameters for policy simulations leads 
to misleading results.  
8 Collier and Dollar also assume that donors have absolutely no influence 
on recipients’ policies. This assumption, which simplifies the algebra, 
does not accord with reality. 
9 The growth-aid relationships posited by BD (2000) differ from that in 
Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). In BD (2000), the coefficient on the 
estimated aid2 term is statistically insignificant, whereas in Collier and 
Dollar (2001, 2002), this term is negative and statistically significant. 
However, without this negative coefficient on the aid2 term, Collier and 
Dollar’s poverty-efficient rule does not yield an interior solution. 
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However, the Collier and Dollar framework for optimal allocation is 
crude. First, poverty reduction is not a function of economic growth only: 
it is also influenced by many other factors, such as human and social 
investments.10 The currently accepted multidimensional concept of 
poverty, which has been encapsulated in the MDGs, goes beyond the 
traditional view that equates poverty with low income. Collier and 
Dollar’s approach to deriving a “poverty-efficient” aid-allocation rule fails 
to recognize both the multidimensionality of poverty and the role social 
and human investments play in poverty reduction. 
Second, the Collier-Dollar formulation of poverty-efficient allocation is 
not the appropriate rule if the objective is to attain pre-defined poverty 
reduction targets (within  a given timeframe)  in all  developing countries, 
as envisioned in the MDGs. According to the millennium compact, the 
fundamental basis for allocating aid across countries should be MDG 
assessments11 and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).12 In 
                                                     
10 Mosley et al. (2004) constructed a pro-poor (public) expenditure (PPE) 
index that is a weighted average of the proportions of GDP spent on 
poverty-related activities such as health and education. Arguing that this    
index is a key determinant of poverty reduction, they  offered an 
alternative formulation to Collier-Dollar’s poverty-efficient allocation of 
aid, based on the PPE index. 
11 There has been an outpouring of MDG-related reports in the last few 
years from international organizations. Most of these are country-level 
reports are produced by the United Nations; since 2004,  the World Bank  
(in collaboration with the IMF) has issued an annual report called The 
Global Monitoring Report, which tracks progress in MDGs at the global 
level. 
12 To receive development assistance, low-income countries (with a few 
exceptions, such as India) are required to prepare national poverty 
reduction strategies (PRS). These Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) are prepared by governments with the assistance of the World 
Bank and IMF staffs. The PRSP of a country typically catalogues its 
macroeconomic, structural and social policies; reviews its programs to 
promote growth and reduce poverty; and estimates external financing 
needs. According to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(2005), PRSPs are guided by five core principles: they  should be (i) 
country-driven, involving broad-based participation by civil society and 
the private sector; (ii) results-oriented, based on outcomes that benefit 
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reality, as Sachs (2005, p. 270)  noted, the MDGs were chronically 
underfunded.  
Third, as noted by Collier and Dollar (2002), if aid-allocation were not 
politically constrained with ad hoc limits on allocations to large countries, 
then the poverty-efficient allocation would imply overwhelmingly 
favorable disbursements to India, with its better policies and a higher 
incidence of poverty. However, such an allocation rule conflicts with the 
notion of inter-country equity, as envisioned in the millennium 
compact.13 
In light of the above, there are reasons to be skeptical about the extent 
to which the insights on aid effectiveness can be transferred from growth 
to poverty reduction. However, it should be obvious that, depending on 
the quality and composition, an amount of development assistance can 
have distinctly different impacts on economic growth, as contrasted from 
poverty reduction. Therefore, if poverty reduction is the overarching 
objective, the empirical analysis should be framed in such a way that it 
speaks directly to the question of poverty reduction. 
B.  DEFINING  GOOD  POLICIES  AND  INSTITUTIONS 
The selectivity proposition, popularized by BD and the World Bank 
(1998), is anchored in a notion of “good” policies/institutions. While few 
would quarrel with the fact that good policies and institutions contribute 
to aid effectiveness, there is little agreement on what constitutes good 
policies and institutions. Dollar and his collaborators used a list of 
different indices to explore policies and institutions in their aid-
effectiveness studies. This list of indices includes the BD policy index, 
which is essentially a proxy for sound macroeconomic policy; the index of 
                                                     
the poor; (iii) comprehensive in addressing the multidimensional nature 
of poverty; (iv) partnership-oriented, involving the participation of 
development partners--bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental; 
and (v) long-term in perspective.  
13 There is an inherent equity-efficiency tradeoff in aid allocation. 
Allocations that support the neediest may not be the most speediest in  
global poverty reduction . No matter what the objective is—be it growth 
or poverty reduction—this dilemma between equity and efficiency 
persists.  
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economic management, which is a combination of the BD policy index 
and the Knack and Keefer (1995) measure of institutional quality (ICRGE); 
the Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Labotan (2002) (KKZ) index of 
governance;14 and the World Bank’s country policy and institutional 
assessment (CPIA) index.15 As we noted earlier, even though the 
conditional aid-effectiveness proposition is intuitively plausible, it has 
also proven to be statistically fragile. 
Despite persistent criticisms, CPIA has been used by the World Bank to 
allocate concessional aid resources.16 Allocating aid by CPIA punishes 
countries that are the most developmentally challenged. As Dalgaard et 
al. (2004) have noted, there is a strong correlation between countries 
with poor CPIA and countries in the tropics. Thus, using the CPIA to 
allocate aid punishes countries with unfavorable initial conditions. It is 
                                                     
14 BD (2004) revisited the empirical aid-growth relationship, employing 
the KKZ index of governance. The KKZ index is an amalgam of a large 
number of subjective assessments of institutional quality primarily made 
by institutional investors. 
15 The CPIA index has 16 components in four categories: macroeconomic 
policies, structural policies, public sector management, and social 
inclusion. Prior to 2004, the CPIA had 20 items in four different 
categories. In 2004, there was a review of the CPIA that led to the 
deletion of some items and to the streamlining and combining of others 
(World Bank, 2005) for more information.  In recent years, the World 
Bank has undertaken further reviews of the index, leading to some 
changes of the process within the Bank, but not in the content of the 
index.  
16 The actual allocation formula followed by the World Bank, which has 
been adopted by regional development banks with some marginal 
modifications, is both complex and convoluted. Roughly, allocation of aid 
per capita for a country is largely based on its “performance” rating, 
though some weight is also given to its per capita income. The 
performance rating is derived from the country’s CPIA and portfolio 
performance scores (the weights being .80 and .20 respectively). This 
weighted average is multiplied by a “governance factor,” which is 
essentially derived from the scores of the governance items in the CPIA. 
As is evident from the allocation formula, the CPIA— in particular, 
governance factors—drives the allocation process. See World Bank 
(2004). 
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possible to conflate climate-related problems with poor CPIA ratings and 
the willingness to reform. Second, as the CPIA is likely to be endogenous, 
it cannot be meaningfully used for forecasts and policy simulations.  
Aside from the above specific objections against the CPIA, there are some 
general conceptual and methodological issues that apply to all such 
indices. First, it has been noted that popular indices of governance and 
institutions such as the ICGER and the KKZ are largely measures of 
outcomes (Glaeser et al. 2004) and not “deeper characteristics” of 
institutions, in the sense of North (1981).17 As such, these indicators are 
poor surrogates for institutional quality, and unsuitable for exploring the 
causal relationships between institutions and growth.  
Third, the most common indices of good institutions are subjective 
assessments. In the case of the CPIA, it reflects the perceptions of the 
World Bank bureaucracy; in the case of the ICGER and the KKZ, they are 
based largely on surveys of domestic and foreign investors. In these 
surveys, the respondents are asked to provide their views on the safety 
of their investments or their ratings on the “rule of law.” Given that the 
survey results are an aggregation of individual views, the indices 
essentially reflect the investors’ perception,  and not an objective 
assessment of the institutional framework.  
Fourth, the indices implicitly take the reform agenda embodied in the 
Washington and post-Washington consensus as the benchmark. This 
reform agenda is largely ahistorical: it represents a “one-size-fit-all” 
model that does not take into account any particular country’s 
circumstances. These indices imply that, irrespective of its stage of 
economic development or its position in its historical trajectory,  a 
country would benefit from minimizing its distance  from the Washington 
and post-Washington consensus. However, for a poor country, attaining 
                                                     
17 North (1981, p. 201-2) defined institutions as a “set of rules, 
compliances procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms 
designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interest of 
maximizing the wealth or utility of principles.” In other words, the 
institution is the overarching framework of rules and constraints that 
regulates the interactions among the individuals. 
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the best-practice institutions or first-best policies is not feasible— nor 
even perhaps desirable.  
Recent development experiences of high-performing Asian economies 
offer three lessons in this respect.18 First, there is no unique route to 
desirable institutional outcomes. The process of institutional 
development is gradual, path-dependent and endogenous.19 Institutions 
need to be suitable to local conditions; the experience of China in this 
respect is instructive. It did not achieve its growth miracle by 
implementing the  Washington and post-Washington consensus; it 
achieved its growth miracle by implementing  policies and institutions ( 
which created  economic incentives and fostered market competition)  
that   were  appropriate to local conditions.  
To give an example, China has achieved some measure of effective 
private property rights through unique institutional innovations despite 
the absence of any de jure private property rights until very recently 
(Qian 2003). Rather than privatize land and industrial assets, the Chinese 
government implemented novel institutional arrangements, such as the 
household responsibility system and township and village enterprises 
(TVEs). Under the household responsibility system, land was “assigned” 
to individual households according to their size. In TVEs, formal 
ownership rights were given not to private hands but to local 
communities (townships or villages). Local governments had a vested 
                                                     
18 Quibria (2006) argued that the empirical relationship between 
governance and growth is not as watertight as it is conventionally 
assumed. Drawing on a set of cross-country growth regressions for 
developing Asia, he demonstrates that rapid economic growth in Asia has 
not necessarily gone hand in hand with superior governance.  
19 This point has forcefully been made by North (2000), who argued that 
“even if we did have it right for one economy it would not necessarily be 
right for another economy and even if we have it right today it would not 
necessarily be right tomorrow … we do know a good deal about the 
institutional foundations of successful development…. What is still 
missing is how to get there. The key is the way path dependence will 
constrain the process of institutional and economic change.” In other 
words, the context matters in institutional innovation. 
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interest to ensure the prosperity of these enterprises as their equity 
stake in TVEs generated revenues directly for them. In the economic and 
political environment of China, property rights were effectively more 
secure under direct local government ownership than they would have 
been under a private property-rights legal regime. According to Rodrik 
(2003), the efficiency loss incurred due to the absence of private control 
rights was probably outweighed by the implicit security guaranteed by 
local government control.  
Second, a transition from a low- to high-growth trajectory typically 
combines orthodox and unorthodox institutional practices (Rodrik 2003). 
Again, the experience of China is illustrative: China provided market 
incentives through a two-track system of reform that combines elements 
of orthodoxy with unorthodox practices. Its reform in agricultural 
liberalization, property rights, and trade liberalization is far from 
comprehensive. For example, China did not achieve the benefits of trade 
liberalization through a comprehensive program of tariff reductions but 
by creating a cluster of special economic zones.  
Third, to accelerate growth, large-scale institutional reform is neither 
necessary nor feasible. Indeed, well-known historical episodes of growth 
acceleration have been achieved through gradual experimentation 
(Rodrik 2003). Examples from recent economic history include Korea in 
the 1960s experimenting with deregulation of the currency and the real 
interest rate; China in the 1970s proceeding gradually with experimental 
liberalization; and India in the 1980s dismantling some anti-business 
practices.  
In short, it is not appropriate to compare the institutions of a poor 
developing country to the “first-best” policy-institutions of advanced 
countries. As Dixit (2004) noted, it is neither necessary nor possible to 
create Western-style institutions from scratch. He recommends 
incremental improvements—working with the existing alternative 
institutions and building on them. This, of course, presupposes a good 
understanding of the various institutions of governance: how they 
function and interact with each other.  
In sum, good polices and institutions for aid effectiveness are not clearly 
and unambiguously defined: they are context specific and path 
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dependent. There is no single set of “ideal” policies and institutions, the 
benchmark against which the performance of all countries can be 
precisely measured; there is no single template that can be mechanically 
applied to all countries, irrespective of their economic constraints and 
stages of development. This behooves donors to take a more flexible-- 
and less doctrinaire-- approach to policies and institutions.  
  
C.  EX  POST  VERSUS  EX  ANTE  CONDITIONALITY 
An interesting econometric result from BD (1997), which received little 
attention and was largely neglected in practice, was that aid has no 
influence on policy reform. This finding is further corroborated by such 
studies as Alesina and Dollar (2000), Botchway et al. (1998) and Killick, 
Gunatilaka, and Marr (1998). A succinct summary of these results is given 
by  the World Bank (1998) report, Assessing Aid, which noted that  there 
is “surprisingly little relationship between the amount of aid and policies” 
(p. 47: there exists “a mountain of literature [that] conclude[s] with 
skepticism about the ability of conditionality to promote reform in 
countries where there is no strong local movement in that direction” (p. 
51). However, in practice, the World Bank does not pay heed to its own 
advice   that policy conditionality does not work. 20   
There are many reasons why policy conditionality is ineffective. First, 
there is often a divergence of views between the donor and recipient 
regarding the program. This divergence can relate to both primary issues, 
such as the content of the program, and   secondary issues, such as the 
means, sequence or timeframe for achieving the program. Second, policy 
conditionality often fails because of the dynamic time inconsistency 
problem. The recipient government may agree to a reform program prior 
                                                     
20 Conditionality in the traditional sense refers to ex ante policy 
conditionality; i.e., policy and institutional reform conditions attached to 
loan disbursements by international financial institutions. However, in 
recent years, there has been a shift in emphasis toward “process 
conditionality,” which links lending to changes in the process. The 
process now involves the participation of NGOs and local communities in 
PRSPs. The putative objectives of process conditionality are to foster 
greater accountability of the government, minimize corruption, and 
inculcate respect for human rights. 
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to receiving aid but renege on the promise after receiving aid (as 
incentives change after aid disbursement). As the interactions between 
the donor and the recipient are both dynamic as well as asymmetric, the 
issue of conditionality is more than designing an incentive-compatible 
contract in a static principal-agent framework.  
Third, the current structure of incentives on the donor side may  also 
have some adverse impact on  the final attainment of conditionality .  
Existing incentive systems in donor agencies place a high value on aid 
disbursement, even if it means some connivance at the failure of 
conditionality. Similarly, such failures may arise from individual 
compassion, because of the so-called “Samaritan’s dilemma”: there is a 
keen desire to help the poor in aid-recipient countries. However, while 
the poor may benefit from conditionalities in the long run, there is often 
a trade-off between relatively low short-term gains against potentially 
higher long-term benefits. This can lead aid agencies to overlook the non-
fulfillment of policy actions in poor countries (Kanbur 2003).  
The ineffectiveness of policy conditionality has elicited two different 
types of views. The first view  is that conditionality works in theory but 
not in practice because of flawed application. According to this view—
associated with Mosley et al. (1995), among others—conditionality would 
work if it was properly designed and conscientiously implemented. This 
requires that conditionality be simple; breaches of conditionality be 
punished consistently; and reforms must be country owned.21  
                                                     
21 The operations evaluation department of the World Bank identified 
four key leadership criteria for country ownership: (i) the locus of 
initiative must be in the government; (ii) key policymakers must be 
intellectually convinced; (iii) there must be evidence of public support 
from the top political leadership; and (iv) there must be broad-based 
stakeholder participation. Fostering country ownership thus entails 
extensive consultation between the government and other segments of 
society, including civil society and the private sector. In addition to 
eliciting new ideas, knowledge, and opinions, this consultation can help 
to promote a consensus on the strategy. As the definition of ownership is 
largely subjective, an assessment of ownership has, by necessity, 
remained subjective. 
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However, the concept of country ownership has remained fluid: it 
sometimes refers to the commitment of the whole recipient society-- the 
government, civil society, and the private sector; sometimes, it refers 
only to the commitment of the government. Given the plasticity of the 
concept, Buiter (2004) finds this an “unhelpful” and “misleading,” 
concept “whose time has gone.” However, this criticism notwithstanding, 
donor agencies repeat ad nauseam the importance of country 
ownership).22 To confer greater ownership to recipient countries, the 
World Bank, the IMF, and other international donor agencies now 
develop their country programs around PRSPs.23 
The second type of view is that traditional ex ante policy conditionality 
does not work and should be replaced by ex post policy conditionality24 
(which is tantamount to selectivity).25 That is, aid should be given to 
                                                     
22Despite the rhetoric, donors have consistently undermined ownership 
by maintaining various types of controls over the design and 
implementation of reform programs. This is contrary to the 
recommendation of Stiglitz (1999), who argued that the donors’ role 
should be limited to that of economic advisors who apprise countries of 
the prevailing views. 
23 However, most recipient countries view PRSPs as a vehicle for 
accessing donor money than a declaration of ownership for various 
reasons. First, PRSPs continue to be largely donor-driven in countries 
where the domestic capacity to formulate such a strategy is lacking 
(Easterly 2006). Second, even where such capacities exist, the PRSP 
exercise is often an act of “ventriloquism” than an expression of national 
economic determination (Van de Walle 2005). Recipients write what 
donors want to hear--they highlight the programs and strategies that the 
donors favor and likely to fund.  
24 Ex-post policy conditionality is often coupled with process 
conditionality, which focuses on participation: openness, transparency 
and inclusive nature of the polity of recipient countries. Assessment of 
participation can be subjective and imprecise, because they tend to 
understate the value of indigenous institutions (such as local government 
institutions and civil society) vis- a- vis internationally visible NGOs for 
ensuring transparency and accountability (Barder and Birdsall 2006).  
25 In its traditional sense, (ex-ante) conditionality is a dual of selectivity. 
Under conditionality, a country receives aid on the basis of a promise to 
undertake a stipulated set of policy actions: it entails a set of prior actions 
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countries based on ex post policies. If pursued consistently, selectivity 
will ensure a superior outcome. In a “repeated game,” as long as the 
donor consistently rewards aid to countries that demonstrate good 
policies, it will elicit good behavior from the recipient. 
Gunning (2000) listed the four objections against selectivity (or ex-post 
conditionality). First, selectivity by definition excludes aid to countries 
with poor governance and unsound policies; 26 consequently, poor people 
living in those countries who could potentially benefit from foreign 
assistance suffer. Second, countries with good policies are able to 
generate adequate domestic and foreign private investments and hence 
can do so without foreign assistance. Third, selectivity makes aid 
allocation contingent on the definition of good policies. While some 
aspects of good policy may be objectively defined, others involve 
subjective judgments; given this subjectivity, there is little consensus on 
good policies, leading to donor-recipient bargaining. Fourth, selectivity 
may conflict with ownership. This happens when donors attempt to 
provide detailed “multidimensional” definitions of “good policies,” which 
recipients often find inconsistent with their development objectives. 
Gunning (2000) considered the first two objections unsustainable. With 
respect to the first objection, he argued that poor people in poor 
countries do not benefit from foreign assistance when the quality of 
governance is questionable. However, one way to circumvent this 
problem is to assist the poor through NGOs. With respect to the second 
objection, Gunning argued that even if policies are good, poor countries 
do not metamorphose overnight into developed countries. In the interim 
period, when domestic savings and foreign private investments are 
inadequate, foreign aid has to play a key role in the transformation 
process.  
                                                     
before the loan is disbursed. While conditionality relates to ex-ante 
reform, selectivity relates to ex-post reform—aid is made available ex 
post based on the success of the reform.  
26 Thus, selectivity excludes countries with well-meaning, enlightened 
leaders who have the will but not the institutional capacity to address 
governance issues (Barder and Birdsall 2006). 
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In sum, ex-ante policy conditionality is largely ineffective in practice, so is 
selectivity (which is now commonly used in conjunction with process 
conditionality), contrary to donors’ original expectation. Conditions 
exogenously imposed rarely succeed. This led many, including Kanbur et 
al. (1999) and Ranis (2006), to argue that for effectiveness, the recipients 
need to be given full autonomy over aid allocation , project 
implementation and policy formulation. Moreover, aid from all agencies 
should be pooled and allocated as lump-sum transfers to recipient 
countries.  
D.  MEASUREMENT:  OUTCOMES  VERSUS  POLICIES 
How should aid be allocated across countries? How does the current 
practice of selectivity, which is based on assessments of government 
policies, compare to an alternative based on assessments of outcomes as 
a measure of country performance? The same debate extends to the 
issue of conditionality. 
Outcome-based conditionality should be distinguished from policy 
conditionality. In the former, donors focus on results in terms of impact 
and outcomes, rather than on inputs, activities and outputs.27 There are 
pros and cons for each choice. The main argument in favor of policy-
based conditionality vis-à-vis outcome-based conditionality is that the 
former is easier to observe and monitor and has greater incentive effects. 
Policies are more directly controllable by governments and their 
implementation can be more easily monitored. On the other hand, 
                                                     
27 Inputs refer to the financial, human, and material resources used for a 
development intervention; for example, the budget used for constructing 
schools or health centers. Outputs refer to products, goods and services 
that result from a development intervention; for example, the number of 
schools built or the number of health centers opened. Outcomes refer to 
intermediate indicators of results, such as the number of students 
graduated from school and the number of visitors to the health centers. 
And finally, impact refers long-term consequences of the intervention; for 
example, improvements in health and educational indicators. As it is 
difficult in practice to distinguish between the medium-term outcomes 
and long-term impacts, they are often lumped together under the 
heading of outcomes.  
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outcomes are not under the full control of governments; they reflect a 
variety of influences, including negative exogenous shocks. Moreover, 
there is often a large time lag between policy decisions and outcomes 
such as economic growth and poverty reduction. This combination of 
time lags and weak links between policies and outcomes can further 
dilute incentives for governments to undertake positive policy actions.  
The main argument for outcome-based conditionality vis-à-vis policy-
based conditionality is that it promotes greater ownership and 
accountability. Some observers arguedfor example, Gunning 
(2000)that the present practice of a detailed assessment of the entire 
policy environment is unnecessary and undermines ownership. As donors 
should be more concerned with outcomes, governments should be given 
a free hand to choose their policies. This freedom helps promote 
ownership of policies and strengthens accountability, which contributes 
to greater private sector confidence.  
All types of conditionality are imperfect in the sense that they do not 
ensure a first-best outcome. Drazen and Fischer (1997) identified three 
reasons for such failures: first, government policies are imperfectly 
observable; second, results are not fully determined by policies but are 
also influenced by luck; third, governments have varying degrees of 
competence, which cannot be readily distinguished ex ante. In addition, 
there is a lot of uncertainty—as well as imperfect information—regarding 
the ‘results chain’ that tracks the causal consequence of a development 
intervention, from inputs and activities to outputs, outcomes, and 
impacts.  
Under outcome-based conditionality, donors should focus on impact and 
outcome indicators. However, the implementation of such conditionality 
is fraught with practical difficulties. The results indicators commonly 
suggested for outcome-monitoring are GDP growth, changes in poverty, 
and changes in child mortality; however, except for growth rates, current 
data on poverty and mortality are not always readily available. Second, as 
most of the outcome indicators are likely to change gradually, any 
meaningful impact assessment can only be done after an interval of a few 
years, and such assessments may reward or punish the current 
government for the actions of the previous government. 
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Given these difficulties, outcome-based conditionality that purports to 
monitor longer-term impact and medium-term outcome indicators may 
be supplemented by output and other intermediate results indicators. 
Depending on the availability and accuracy of different types of 
indicators, the optimal choice may need to include a mixture of impact 
and outcome indicators—that is, intermediate and final results.28 
V.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
This paper juxtaposes the empirical research on aid effectiveness against 
current policy concerns. In recent years, this chasm between the 
empirical research and the policies and practices seems to have widened 
further with the former trending more toward obfuscation and obtuse 
econometrics and away from substantive policy issues and practices. 
Given this divergent concerns of research and policy, one cannot help 
wonder whether the two are marching to different drummers and 
whether they will ever come to converge. Needless to emphasize, such a 
convergence of the two universes are essential both for a sophisticated 
understanding of the underlying issues and for devising appropriate 
policies and practices for effective use of foreign assistance. 
This paper argues that empirical research on foreign aid must be 
reframed. The focus of the research needs to go beyond the current 
obsession about the “average”: does foreign aid work on “average”? Or 
what is the “average” effect of a particular aid intervention?  Research 
needs to focus on why, how and when foreign aid has worked in 
particular societies. Only by finding the mechanisms and processes that 
explain why and how aid works in a particular society will it be possible to 
design and deliver foreign aid effectively.  
                                                     
28 Barder and Birdsall (2006) recommended a hands-off approach to aid 
allocation to poorer countries, based on evidence of progress on the 
ground--measured in terms of outcomes rather than intermediate inputs. 
This type of arrangement would afford recipient institutions more 
flexibility, autonomy and space for institutional experimentation.  
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This discovery would require going beyond the narrow analytics of cross-
country growth regressions or for that matter RCTs.  As a tool, cross-
country growth regressions have proved to be too coarse to capture the 
complex mechanisms and processes undergirding   aid effectiveness. 
Similarly, RCTs have their own shortcomings. They focus exclusively   on 
the average impact; they provide little or no light on causality; and they 
also lack external validity. All these reasons make RCTs an unreliable 
analytical basis for formulating robust strategy and policies at the macro-
level. An effective aid policy requires country-specific insights, which can 
be gleaned only from in-depth country studies that capture the flavor and 
texture of individual countries—in particular its institutions and politics29 
( Deaton, 2013) -- nuances that are lost in mechanical manipulation of 
data. 
Currently, there is a huge disjunction between research and practice, 
similar to what transpired in other sciences in earlier times.  In his 
magisterial history of cancer research, Mukherjee (2010) noted that little 
interactions took place prior to the 1960s between those who studied 
cancer in the laboratory and those who treated cancer in the clinic: “The 
two conversations seemed to be occurring in sealed and separate 
universes.” Researchers and the community of practice in foreign aid 
seem to similarly inhabit two separate universes. However, as the history 
of biomedical sciences suggests, the prospects of breakthroughs in 
intractable diseases are greatest when there is a tight feedback 
mechanism between research and practice. The field of foreign aid is no 
exception to this general rule. 
                                                     
29 According to Deaton (2013), the key to understanding aid effectiveness 
lies in the relationship between aid and politics, as political and legal 
institutions play a central role in fostering an environment conducive to 
prosperity and economic growth.  
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